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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOMELAND HOUSEWARES, LLC, a California LLC; NUTRIBULLET, LLC, L a California LLC,)	Case No. CV 14-03954 DDP (MANx)
)	
Plaintiffs,)	ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
)	DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S
)	MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED
)	COMPLAINT
v.)	
)	[Dkt. No. 51.]
EURO-PRO OPERATING LLC, a Massachusetts LLC,)	
)	
Defendant.)	
_____)	

18
19 Before the court is Defendant's motion to dismiss various
20 claims in Plaintiffs' Second-Amended Complaint. Having considered
21 the parties' submissions and heard oral arguments, the Court adopts
22 the following order.

23 **I. BACKGROUND**

24 Plaintiffs Homeland Housewares, LLC and Nutribullet, LLC
25 (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Homeland") and Defendant
26 Euro-Pro Operating, LLC ("Euro-Pro") both sell and advertise home
27 blenders. (Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") ¶¶ 5-6, Dkt. No. 47.)
28 Plaintiffs sell and advertise several single-serving blenders under

1 its BULLET line of products, including the MAGIC BULLET, the
2 NUTRIBULLET, the NUTRIBULLET SPORT, and the NUTRIBULLET PRO. (Id.
3 at ¶ 4.) Likewise, Defendants sell blenders and kitchen appliances
4 and are known for their NUTRI NINJA PRO blender. (Id. at ¶ 6.)

5 Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief for false
6 advertising under federal and state law, trade dress infringement,
7 trade libel, and unfair competition. (Id. generally.)

8 Plaintiffs take issue with the product packaging for the NUTRI
9 NINJA. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs allege that, in an attempt to
10 draw consumers, Defendants "chose to duplicate the color scheme,
11 fonts, phraseology, and overall look and feel of the Plaintiffs'
12 NUTRIBULLET packing trade dress." (Id.) Plaintiffs' further
13 allege Defendants made false statements on the NUTRI NINJA PRO
14 packaging show, specifically regarding the capabilities and
15 functions of the NUTRIBULLET. (Id. at ¶ 13-14.)

16 In addition, Plaintiffs allege Defendants have "launched a
17 campaign to plant false reviews on the Internet making false claims
18 of defects in NUTRIBULLET blenders and touting the NUTRI NINJA as a
19 superior alternative." (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs claim that all
20 the reviews on a specific website contain the same pattern; the
21 reviews list the defect in the NUTRIBULLET, compare it to the NUTRI
22 NINJA, and agree that the NUTRI NINJA is better. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.)

23 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have launched a campaign to
24 plant false statements about the NUTRIBULLET in its NUTRI NINJA
25 infomercials. (Id. at ¶ 19.) In the infomercial, Defendants show
26 a performance comparison test of the NUTRI NINJA DUO to the
27 NUTRIBULLET. (Id.) However, Plaintiffs allege this comparison
28 failed to properly use the NUTRIBULLET, thereby producing what

1 Plaintiffs call "a false result." (Id. at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff claims
2 the comparison test and the statements by the host that the
3 NUTRIBULLET "clearly had trouble" blending the contents are false
4 statements about the NUTRIBULLET. (Id. at ¶ 19.)

5 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the false statements above
6 also constitute trade libel and unfair competition. (Id. at ¶¶ 40-
7 51.)

8 In this motion to dismiss, Defendant seeks to dismiss
9 Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. (12)(b)(6),
10 arguing that Plaintiffs fail to state plausible claims.

11 **II. LEGAL STANDARDS**

12 In order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
13 claim, a complaint need only include "a short and plain statement
14 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Bell
15 Atl. Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 55 (2007) (quoting Conley v.
16 Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint must include
17 "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
18 relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
19 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
20 570 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must
21 "accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe
22 those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick
23 v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Although a complaint
24 need not include "detailed factual allegations," it must offer
25 "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
26 accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory allegations or
27 allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion
28 "are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679.

1 **III. DISCUSSION**

2 **A. False Advertising Claims: False Internet Reviews**

3 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has "launched a campaign to
4 plant false reviews" of Plaintiffs' products on the Internet.
5 (SAC, ¶ 15.) As an example, Plaintiffs point to a particular
6 internet review and comment thereto containing some negative
7 comments about the "NUTRIBULLET" product or products - for example,
8 that contents spill from the NUTRIBULLET's blender jar, and that
9 lubricant leaks into the blender jar. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-18.)
10 Plaintiffs allege that the review and the comment are not neutral
11 reviews, but rather are "just . . . false advertising by Euro-Pro
12 under the deceptive guise of consumer reviews." (Id. at ¶ 18.)

13 To state a claim for false advertising under the federal
14 Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125),¹ a defendant must allege (1) a false
15 statement in a commercial advertisement about its own or another's
16 product; (2) the statement actually deceived or has a tendency to
17 deceive consumers; (3) the deception is material to purchasers; (4)
18 entry into interstate commerce; and (5) injury. Southland Sod
19 Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir.1997). The
20 Court previously dismissed a similar claim in Plaintiffs' First
21 Amended Complaint ("FAC"), primarily because the claim in that
22 complaint alleged only that Defendant made "false claims of

23 _____
24 ¹Plaintiffs also bring false advertising claims under
25 California's Unfair Competition Act. See California Business and
26 Professions Code § 17200 ("As used in this chapter, unfair
27 competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or
28 fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue
or misleading advertising . . ."). However, such claims are
"'substantially congruent' to claims made under the Lanham Act."
Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1994).
Therefore, the Court analyzes the state and federal false
advertising claims together.

1 defects" in reviews "on the internet." (Dkt. No. 50 at 4:11-5:22.)
2 Because such extremely generic claims were too vague to provide
3 notice to Defendants as to Plaintiffs' theory of liability, or to
4 state a plausible claim,² the Court dismissed under the
5 Iqbal/Twombly standard.

6 In the Second Amended Complaint, however, Plaintiffs'
7 allegations are much more specific. Plaintiffs point to a specific
8 review of its product on the internet as well as a comment on that
9 review. The review and the comment allegedly make particular
10 factual statements about Plaintiffs' products. Plaintiffs allege
11 that these statements are false, and that they are "false reviews"
12 planted by Defendant. These allegations suffice to state the first
13 prong of a Lanham Act claim. As to the other prongs, Plaintiffs
14 allege that "Euro-Pro is able to convince consumers that its
15 inferior product is equal to or superior to the quality of the
16 [NUTRIBULLET]," (SAC, ¶ 24), and that Defendant's alleged deception
17 has actually changed consumer behavior and thus injured Plaintiffs.
18 (Id. at ¶ 26.) Assuming, as seems reasonable, that placing a
19 review on a widely-available website is placing a statement into
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26 ²"[A]llegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply
27 recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain
28 sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and
to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr
v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

1 interstate commerce,³ these allegations suffice to state a claim
2 for false advertising.⁴

3 **B. False Advertising Claims: Product Comparison on Infomercial**

4 Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants engaged in false
5 advertising when they created an infomercial comparing the
6 NUTRIBULLET to the NUTRI NINJA. (SAC, ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs allege
7 that Defendants's infomercial included a head-to-head comparison of
8 the two blenders attempting to blend the same⁵ "ice, frozen fruits,
9 and . . . fibrous, difficult to extract vegetables, nuts, and
10 seeds." (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that one of the hosts of the
11 infomercial declared that the NUTRIBULLET had "trouble" blending
12 those ingredients, while the NUTRI NINJA did not. (Id.)
13 Plaintiffs allege that the comparison is literally false because
14 "the comparison test fails to properly use the NUTRIBULLET by
15 filling the NUTRIBULLET container with a sufficient amount of
16 liquid." (Id. at ¶ 20.) In other words, "the infomercial does not
17 show that the NUTRIBULLET has 'trouble' blending *if the NUTRIBULLET*
18 *were operated according to its instructions.*" (Opp'n at 7:18-20
19 (emphasis added).)

20
21 ³"[A]s both the means to engage in commerce and the method by
22 which transactions occur, the Internet is an instrumentality and
23 channel of interstate commerce." United States v. Sutcliffe, 505
F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Trotter,
478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir.2007)).

24 ⁴Defendant notes that Plaintiffs have incorrectly described
25 the allegedly false reviews as comparing the NUTRIBULLET to the
26 NUTRI NINJA PRO, when in fact the NUTRIBULLET is compared to the
27 "Ninja BL201 Kitchen System Pulse." (Pls.' Mem. P. & A. ISO Mot.
Dismiss at 5.) This mistake is not fatal to the claim, however, as
the material question is what the review says about the
NUTRIBULLET, not Defendant's own products.

28 ⁵"Both blenders are filled with the same ingredients"
(SAC, ¶ 19.)

1 Plaintiffs' allegations are notable for what they do not
2 claim. Plaintiffs do not suggest, for example, that the producers
3 of the infomercial ran the NUTRIBULLETT on low power while running
4 the NUTRI NINJA on high power. Nor do they suggest that some
5 component of the NUTRIBULLETT - the blade, perhaps - is missing in
6 the demonstration. Finally, Plaintiffs do not allege that the
7 NUTRIBULLETT is actually effective in blending that particular
8 combination of ingredients. On Plaintiffs' own allegations, the
9 only way in which the producers of the infomercial did not operate
10 the NUTRIBULLETT "according to its instructions" is that they did
11 not *add* an additional ingredient (some liquid) to the mix of items
12 to be blended. But not adding liquid does not result in a
13 literally false impression on the part of the viewer. Rather, it
14 creates the literally true impression that the NUTRI NINJA can
15 blend this particular set of ingredients without adding any liquid,
16 while the NUTRIBULLETT cannot.

17 Of course, a literally true statement can still constitute
18 false advertising "if it can be shown that the advertisement has
19 misled, confused, or deceived the consuming public." Southland Sod
20 Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 1997). But
21 it is hard to see how this demonstration would mislead, confuse, or
22 deceive the public. The infomercial, on these allegations, does
23 not suggest that there are *no* conditions under which the
24 NUTRIBULLETT could blend ice, fruit, etc., or that the NUTRIBULLETT
25 could *never* produce a satisfactory smoothie or juice. Rather, it
26 shows, apparently correctly, that the NUTRIBULLETT is not as
27 effective at blending a particular set of ingredients in a

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1 particular proportion. Such a demonstration does not confuse; it
2 merely demonstrates that the products perform differently.

3 Because the infomercial did not create a literally false
4 impression or mislead, confuse, or deceive the public, Plaintiffs'
5 allegations as to the infomercial do not state a claim for false
6 advertising.⁶

7 **C. Trade Dress Claim**

8 Plaintiffs' FAC asserted a claim for trade dress infringement
9 as to its product packaging (Dkt. No. 12); that claim was
10 dismissed in the Court's previous order. (Dkt. No. 46.) The SAC
11 states the same claim in considerably more detail. (SAC, ¶¶ 31-
12 34.) Specifically, Plaintiffs assert the following elements of its
13 trade dress: "predominantly" green packaging; block-font, all-
14 capital lettering in white or green; the product's "trademark logo"
15 in the top left hand corner; photo of the product against "a
16 cornucopia of fruits and vegetables"; pictures of blender container
17 filled with blended contents; wattage of the blender on the right
18 side; a "band of text" on the bottom of the package; and
19 distinctive "phraseology," including "Nutri," "Pro," "Extractor,"
20 "Watt," "Power" and "Extractor Blade." (Id.) Additionally,
21 Plaintiffs assert that Defendant's packaging is "confusingly
22 similar" to the "overall look and feel" of Plaintiffs' trade dress.
23 (Id. at ¶ 30.)

24 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled
25 their trade dress claim because they have not pled the claim's

26
27 ⁶At oral argument, Plaintiffs alleged for the first time that
28 the NUTRIBULLET blender used in the infomercial might have been
tampered with. This allegation, however, appears nowhere in the
pleading.

1 "three basic elements: (1) distinctiveness, (2) nonfunctionality,
2 and (3) likelihood of confusion." Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v.
3 E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998).

4 **1. Distinctiveness**

5 "An identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being
6 protected if it *either* (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has
7 acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning." Two Pesos,
8 Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992). The parties
9 focus on the question of acquired secondary meaning.

10 In the SAC, Plaintiffs allege that their packaging has
11 acquired secondary meaning because they have:

12 developed and maintained substantial secondary meaning in [the
13 NUTRIBULLET packaging] through its spending of several hundred
14 million dollars on advertising and promotion of the BULLET
15 line of kitchen appliances and associated trade dress,
16 including the NUTRIBULLET's trade dress. Homeland's
17 advertising and promotion of the NUTRIBULLET's trade dress,
18 through means such as infomercials, has made the primary
19 significance of Homeland's trade dress as an identification of
20 the source of the NUTRIBULLET, rather than identifying the
21 NUTRIBULLET itself in the mind's [sic] of the public.

22 (SAC, ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged specific
23 channels (advertising and infomercials) by which their product
24 packaging has come to be associated with Homeland as the source of
25 the NUTRIBULLET. These allegations are probably sufficient, at the
26 pleading stage, to state a claim based on secondary meaning.

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1 **2. Non-functionality**

2 Plaintiffs state in the SAC that their alleged trade dress is
3 non-functional because its elements are "not essential to the
4 use of the NUTRIBULLET line products" and "were chosen
5 arbitrarily." (SAC, ¶ 35.) Defendants argue that the trade dress
6 is functional, because "the lion's share of the details . . .
7 describe features and functionality of Homeland's Nutribullet
8 Classic and are not arbitrary." (Reply at 10:14-16.)

9 "A product feature is functional and cannot serve as a
10 trademark if the product feature is essential to the use or purpose
11 of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article,
12 that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a
13 significant, non-reputation-related disadvantage." Qualitex Co. v.
14 Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995). Here, at
15 least some of the elements of the trade dress are commonly used by
16 others in the industry, and Plaintiffs could not be given exclusive
17 use of them: e.g., photographs of fruits and vegetables; photos of
18 blended juice; and references to the wattage of the blender's
19 motor.

20 However, multiple functional items may be combined into a non-
21 functional aesthetic whole. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R.
22 Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987). In the case of
23 blender packaging, it is possible to arrange photographs of fruits
24 and vegetables, photos of blended juice, and claims about wattage,
25 along with other purely arbitrary elements like color, typeface,
26 and layout, into a non-functional trade dress. "Viewing the
27 elements as a whole does not result in monopoly protection for
28 necessary [i.e., functional] elements." Id. at 842 n.7.

1 **3. Consumer Confusion**

2 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant's trade dress is likely to
3 cause consumer confusion because "(a) Euro-Pro's Trade Dress is
4 similar to Homeland's Trade Dress as described as depicted in
5 Exhibit 2; (b) Euro-Pro's products bearing the trade dress are the
6 exact same type of goods - blenders - which are sold by Homeland;
7 [and] (c) the marketing channels used for the NUTRI NINJA PRO are
8 the same as the NUTRIBULLET - online and brick-and-mortar retailers
9 for kitchen appliances." (SAC, ¶ 37.) Defendants argue that these
10 allegations are conclusory and that it is "impossible" that
11 consumers will be confused given "obvious differences" between
12 Plaintiffs' packaging and Defendant's - especially Defendant's use
13 of the NUTRI NINJA trademark on its packaging. (Mem. P. & A. ISO
14 Mot. Dismiss at 17-18.)

15 "Factors considered in the likelihood of confusion context
16 include: 1) evidence of actual confusion; 2) defendant's intent in
17 adopting the dress; 3) similarity of trade dress; 4) similarity of
18 goods; 5) similarity of marketing channels; 5) strength of the
19 trade dress; and 6) the type of goods and likely degree of
20 purchaser care or sophistication." Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Impact
21 Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 980, 993 (D. Ariz. 1992).

22 Not all the factors have equal weight, however. Fuddruckers,
23 826 F.2d at 845. The strength and uniqueness of the trade dress
24 and the actual similarity of the two trade dresses are the
25 paramount factors. Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522,
26 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347,
27 351 (9th Cir. 1980).

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1 Here, the elements of the trade dress described by Plaintiffs
2 are largely functional elements (photos of fruit, product photos,
3 product descriptions) arranged in a unique way. Although such
4 trade dress is protectable, it is not as "strong" as something more
5 arbitrary and aesthetic, like the classic Coca-Cola bottle shape.
6 The predominant non-functional element is color, which is not
7 enough, by itself, to warrant strong protection. See First Brands
8 Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1987).
9 Thus, the two trade dresses must be substantially similar in order
10 for there to be a likelihood of consumer confusion.

11 Here, Exhibit 2 to the SAC plainly shows that the two packages
12 are not substantially similar. Although the NUTRI NINJA does use a
13 green background color that is quite close to the green used on the
14 NUTRIBULLET package, that green is offset by black bands at the top
15 and bottom. (On the back and sides of the box, the predominant
16 colors are black and gray; the back and sides of the NUTRIBULLET
17 box retain the green-and-white motif of the front.) Although both
18 companies place their trademark logos in the upper left corner of
19 the front of the box, the "MAGIC BULLET" mark is in thin lettering
20 with a distinctive swirl standing in for the "G" in "MAGIC," while
21 the "NUTRI NINJA" mark features larger block letters that taper
22 from left to right. In the upper right, the NUTRI NINJA box
23 displays its blender blades and trumpets the blender's wattage,
24 while the NUTRIBULLET box displays a list of included parts. At
25 the lower left, the NUTRI NINJA box shows a cyclone of fruits and
26 ice being drawn down into a cup, with three other cups in the
27 background, while the NUTRIBULLET box shows two cups, much larger
28 and closer in scale, and their lids. In short, examining the two

1 packages as a whole, the Court finds that there is no plausible
2 claim that the two are substantially similar, and this is
3 determinative of the question of likelihood of consumer confusion.⁷

4 Plaintiffs have not adequately pled a claim for trade dress
5 infringement.

6 **D. Trade Libel Claim**

7 As to their trade libel claim, Plaintiffs allege that, because
8 Defendant made false statements about their products' quality, they
9 have been harmed, in the form of "lost sales, disruption of
10 business relationships, loss of market share and of customer
11 goodwill." (SAC, ¶¶ 42-43.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have
12 not adequately pled special damages, a required element of the
13 trade libel claim. (Mem. P. & A. ISO Mot. Dismiss at 19-21.)

14 Rule 9 requires that "[w]hen items of special damages are
15 claimed, they shall be specifically stated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(g).
16 Under California law, a cause of action for damages for trade libel
17 requires pleading of special damages in the form of pecuniary loss.
18 Leonardini v. Shell Oil Co., 216 Cal.App.3d 547, 572 (1990). In
19 its previous order dismissing this claim, the Court noted that to
20 plead special damages based on general business loss, Plaintiffs
21 "should have alleged facts showing an established business, the
22 amount of sales for a substantial period preceding the publication,
23 the amount of sales subsequent to the publication, and facts
24 showing that such loss in sales were the natural and probable
25 result of such publication." (Dkt. No. 46 at 9 (quoting Isuzu

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27 ⁷Additionally, the Court notes that one whole side of the
28 NUTRI NINJA box is devoted to comparing the NUTRI NINJA to the
NUTRIBULLET, which would also tend to alleviate consumer confusion.

1 Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035,
2 1047 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (brackets omitted).)

3 In response to the Court's instruction, Plaintiffs now allege
4 somewhat more specific facts in the SAC showing that there was an
5 established business and that that business dropped off after the
6 allegedly false statements:

7 In stores where the NUTRI NINJA PRO started appearing in the
8 second quarter of 2014, sales of the NUTRIBULLET declined an
9 average of about 31%. By comparison, in stores where the NUTRI
10 NINJA PRO was not sold, NUTRIBULLET sales increased in the
11 second quarter of 2014 by an average of 14.5%. Hence, there
12 was a net loss in sales of 45.5% due to Euro-Pro's false
13 statements.

14 The false statements by Euro-Pro proximately caused damage to
15 Homeland in that they have deterred customers from purchasing
16 Homeland's NUTRIBULLET goods As a direct and
17 proximate result of these false statements, Homeland has
18 suffered pecuniary loss in the sum of at least \$1,252,503.53,
19 using the net loss of 45.5% in the second quarter of sales for
20 2014 as a basis to extrapolate the sales Homeland would
21 achieved but for Euro-Pro's false statements.

22 (SAC, ¶¶ 44-45.)

23 Defendant argues that this pleading is ambiguous, because,
24 first, it does not provide a point of comparison (is the drop in
25 comparison to the previous quarter? the same quarter in the
26 previous year? some other time frame?), and second, it does not
27 clarify what "NUTRIBULLET" product was affected, and by what
28 amount. (Reply at 12.)

1 Defendant's argument has some merit - Plaintiff's numbers are
2 not well-tethered to specifics. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have pled,
3 however minimally, a prior market, a drop in sales, and a specific
4 amount lost. That will suffice, at the pleading stage, to state a
5 claim for special damages, a necessary component of their trade
6 libel claim.

7 **IV. CONCLUSION**

8 For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN
9 PART and DENIED IN PART. The false advertising claims as to the
10 infomercial and the trade dress claim are DISMISSED.

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12 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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15 Dated: February 5, 2015

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DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

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